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Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine:
Defining a Restricted Legislative Veto
The principle of absolute nondelegation, as first articulated by John
Locke, holds that legislators, as agents of the people, may not delegate to
others their legislative power.' Strict construction of this principle would
forbid the executive to exercise any part of the legislative power. The
Framers of the Constitution rejected such a pure separation of the legisla-
tive and executive branches, however, requiring only that one branch of
government not exercise the entire power of another.2  Consequently,
when the Supreme Court gave the nondelegation principle practical effect
during the New Deal era, the Court did not insist upon absolute nondele-
gation.3 Instead, the Court upheld a standards requirement,4 requiring
only that Congress make primary policy choices and devise statutory stan-
dards' to guide subordinate policymaking in the executive branch. Since
the New Deal, however, the Court has repeatedly refused to strike down
standardless delegations,' divesting even this compromise of Locke's abso-
lute nondelegation principle of much practical significance.'
Encouraged by the Court's lax enforcement of the standards require-
ment, Congress has dramatically increased its delegations of policymaking
1. J. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government § 141, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
408-09 (P. Laslett ed. 1963) ("The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a
positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed,
which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to
transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands.").
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison) (arguing that Constitution prohibits only exercise
by one branch of whole power of another, but permits partial agency relationship between branches);
THE FEDERALIsT No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[T]he powers properly be-
longing to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of
the other departments.").
3. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935) (Congress may
delegate limited power to determine facts and prescribe subordinate rules); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (same).
4. See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
5. A "standard," as used in this Note and generally in the literature on delegation, is a restriction
upon the discretion that an administrative agency may exercise in implementing a statute. "Imple-
mentation" of a statute contemplates the making of secondary policy choices, the choice of situations to
which a statute is to apply, and the choice of a mechanism for enforcing a statute.
6. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-86, reh'g denied sub nom. Pownall v.
United States, 335 U.S. 836 (1948) (upholding Renegotiation Act, which authorized executive agen-
cies to recover "excessive profits" from defense contractors, without defining term "excessive"); Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding Federal Communi-
cations Act authorizing Federal Communications Commission to license radio stations in accord with
"public interest").
7. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
17 (1982) (nondelegation doctrine relegated to "fugitive existence" after New Deal) [hereinafter cited
as Aranson].
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authority to the executive branch-a practice greatly facilitated by use of
the legislative veto provision.8 With its 1983 decision in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha,9 however, the Court struck down a
one-House legislative veto, 10 using a line of reasoning derived from the
principle of absolute nondelegation. This Note argues that the Court
should have been true to its earlier compromise of the nondelegation prin-
ciple. Under the standards requirement, judicial enforcement of statutory
standards that govern agency policymaking provided a workable substitute
for the constitutional checks of presentment and bicameralism to which
legislative lawmaking is subject. By analogizing to the standards require-
ment, the Court could have found these constitutional checks, the explicit
concerns of the Chadha opinion, inapplicable, and approved a modified
"affirmative" legislative veto11 restricted by judicial review. Such a veto
8. See infra text accompanying notes 44-45, 50-52. The legislative veto enabled Congress to ap-
prove or reject actions taken by administrative agencies exercising discretionary authority delegated by
Congress. For more detailed descriptions of the legislative veto, see Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative
Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467, 467-69 (1962); Javits & Klein, Congres-
sional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455,
456-58, 462-65 (1977).
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Jagdish Chadha was a nonresident alien who, after overstaying his stu-
dent visa, applied to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for suspension of his deporta-
tion. Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982) provides
that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation of an alien who has been physi-
cally present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years, who proves that
during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character, and whose deportation
would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to a spouse, parent or child who is a citizen or
permanent resident. The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities under this provision through
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice. See 8 U.S.C. §
1103(a) (1982).
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) provides
that if either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating that it does not
favor the suspension of an alien's deportation, the Attorney General shall deport the alien or authorize
his voluntary departure at his own expense. If neither the Senate nor the House passes such a resolu-
tion, the Attorney General may cancel deportation proceedings. Id. After an immigration judge sus-
pended Chadha's deportation, the House of Representatives, acting pursuant to this legislative veto
provision, passed a resolution to veto the judge's decision. The House resolution was apparently
prompted by the determination of the House Committee on the Judiciary that Chadha, together with
five other aliens, did not meet the Act's hardship requirement. See 462 U.S. at 926-27.
Chadha responded to the House resolution by challenging the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2). Id. at
928. The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held this one-House veto unconstitutional by virtue of its
failure to comply with the presentment and bicameralism requirements.
10. Depending upon the terms of the enabling legislation, both Houses of Congress, one House,
or a congressional committee could exercise a legislative veto. (Under an affirmative veto provision,
infra note 11, both Houses "exercise" the veto by failing to act; this might be termed a "no-House"
veto.).
11. Two forms of the legislative veto were possible. Under the affirmative form, presidential or
agency action took effect only upon passage of a resolution of approval, so that a veto was accom-
plished by congressional inaction. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at 468. Examples of affirma-
tive veto provisions are contained in the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 635e
(1982) (Presidentially-proposed limitation on exports to Soviet Union in excess of $300 million must
be approved by concurrent resolution), and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(2)
(1982) (tariff or duty recommended by International Trade Commission may be imposed by concur-
rent resolution of approval).
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would advance the goals that gave rise to the standards requirement; it
could also resolve the problem which forced the Court to abandon the
standards requirement after the New Deal, namely that Congress cannot
prescribe appropriate standards for unforeseeable situations.
I. Chadha AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The nondelegation principle derives its theoretical foundation from the
rule of agency law that power transferred by a principal to an agent can-
not be delegated in turn by the agent; such a redelegation would conflict
with the purpose of the original transfer."2 In the legislative context, this
rule implies that congressional delegation of legislative power frustrates
the intent of the people to entrust such power only to representatives
whom they have chosen.1 Such delegation, moreover, permits lawmaking
by parties not subject to constitutional requirements governing adoption of
legislation-namely the election process, presentment, 4 and bicamera-
lism. 5 Together these requirements ensure a sort of legislative due pro-
cess without which the people would not have delegated lawmaking power
to Congress."
Interpreted strictly, the nondelegation doctrine would require Congress
to make all policy determinations. Yet it is impractical to require that
Congress predict each and every circumstance in which its policy must
apply. Before Chadha, the Supreme Court never required either complete
nondelegation of the legislative power, or the absolute separation of pow-
ers which would result."' Instead, the Court sought at most to preserve
Under the negative form, agency action took effect after a specified period of time, unless vetoed by
Congress with a resolution of disapproval. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at 468. Examples of
negative veto provisions are contained in the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a) (1982) (FTC rules may be disapproved by concurrent resolution), and the Act
of January 2, 1975, 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982) (Supreme Court's proposed amendments to Federal
Rules of Evidence may be disapproved by resolution of either House). By whomever exercised and in
either form-inaction or resolution-the legislative veto was as binding upon the affected agency as if
enacted in legislation, and as enforceable in the federal courts. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at
474.
12. See Aranson, supra note 7, at 4.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 & § 7, d. 2.
16. See Aranson, supra note 7, at 4-5.
17. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("[T]he Constitution by no means contem-
plates total separation of each of these three essential branches of Government . . . . [A] hermetic
sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of
a Nation capable of governing itself effectively."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[The Constitution] contemplates that practice will inte-
grate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."); see also THE FEDERALIT No. 47 Ui. Madison) (argu-
ing that three branches need not be wholly separate); cf Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984 (White, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Liegislative authority is routinely delegated to the Executive branch, to the independent regu-
latory agencies, and to private individuals and groups.").
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the nondelegation principle in spirit by enforcing the standards require-
ment,"' which recognizes the practical need for executive discretion in im-
plementation of the law.
The Court first gave the standards requirement both definition and
force 9 with its decisions in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan20 and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States," striking down two provisions
of the National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional delegations of
legislative authority. In Panama Refining, the Court held that Congress
must "perform its function in laying down policies and establishing stan-
dards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts
to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply."" In Pan-
ama Refining and Schechter, the Court found the relevant NIRA provi-
sions to lack adequate standards2" and to contain numerous policy objec-
tives that were both broad and diverse.2 Subsequently, in Yakus v.
18. In Chadha, the Court apparently acknowledged this compromise in a footnote, but the text of
the Court's opinion does not reflect such a recognition. In footnote 16, the Court distinguished be-
tween legislative action and "quasi-legislative" activity by executive agencies on the ground that, al-
though "some administrative agency action-rule making, for example-may resemble 'lawmaking'
... [tihat kind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that
authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review . . . ." 462 U.S. at 953
n.16. This distinction necessarily recognizes that executive agencies do, with the Court's indulgence,
make policy determinations. In fact, the Court cited 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982), defining an agency rule
as a "statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, inter-
pret, or prescribe law or policy . . . ." Id. Footnote 16, however, addresses a claim raised in a brief
submitted by the House of Representatives, that striking down the legislative veto would sanction
lawmaking by the Attorney General. Although the Court refuted this claim with a logic derived from
the standards requirement, the crux of the Court's argument instead relied implicitly upon absolute
nondelegation.
19. Before 1935, the Court's exposition of the standards requirement was imprecise. The Court
approved the ascertainment of facts, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (upholding provision of
Tariff Act of 1890 authorizing President to impose tariff on products of foreign country whose gov-
ernment subjected American goods to tariff that President deemed "reciprocally unequal and unrea-
sonable"), or the filling in of details, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) (upholding
authorization of Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing use of national forests),
by the executive branch, when Congress had declared an "intelligible principle" to guide executive
action, J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (upholding grant of power to Secretary of Treasury to set minimum
quality standard for imported tea). See generally Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power:
II, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 566-69 (1947) (describing early cases in detail).
20. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating § 9(c) of National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No.
73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1935) (expired, as amended, 1936) [hereinafter cited as NIRA], which
authorized President to prohibit interstate shipment of petroleum products produced or withdrawn
from storage in violation of state law).
21. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating § 3 of NIRA, which authorized President to promulgate
codes of fair competition binding on all members of an industry).
22. 293 U.S. at 421.
23. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 430 ("Congress has declared no policy, has established no
standard, has laid down no rule."); Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541 (Section 3 of NIRA "sets up no
standards").
24. 293 U.S. at 418.
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United States, 25 the Court prescribed criteria for evaluating legislative
standards: Standards must be "sufficiently definite and precise" 26 to en-
able a court "to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed." '27
Under the standards requirement, Congress retains responsibility for
primary policy determination, the essential component of the legislative
function. Congress may, however, delegate discretionary authority to ad-
ministrators with more time and expertise to make detailed policy choices
and prescribe subordinate rules. Executive policymaking merely imple-
ments the primary policy declared by Congress, and is thus subject deriva-
tively to the checks of presentment and bicameralism. As Yakus makes
clear, judicial review ensures derivative application of the constitutional
checks by enforcing executive compliance with the statutory standards.
Judicial review, moreover, serves in the context of executive policymaking
a purpose analogous to one served by the presentment and bicameralism
requirements for legislative lawmaking: to prevent lawmakers from arbi-
trary, unwise, or vindictive interference with the lives and property of in-
dividuals. 28 The standards requirement thus represents a workable and
constitutional compromise of the nondelegation principle.29
With its decision in Chadha, however, the Supreme Court abandoned
its practical approach to the issue of delegation and adopted a line of rea-
25. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
26. Id. at 426.
27. Id. at 425.
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442-43 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (presentment
requirement intended "to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design"); 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (1911) ("If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be
neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and
independent branches."); see also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 678 (1929) (President's op-
portunity to study a bill before enactment is constitutional safeguard against "ill-considered and un-
wise legislation").
Judicial review of executive policymaking legitimates not only the delegation of power from Con-
gress to executive agencies, but also from the people to Congress. The people arguably would be
unwilling to delegate their power to Congress, knowing that Congress would redelegate to the execu-
tive branch, without the sort of due process protection provided by judicial review.
29. As the Chadha Court itself acknowledged, "[t]he bicameral process is not necessary as a check
on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond
the limits of the statute that created it," limits to be enforced by judicial review. 462 U.S. at 953 n.16
(citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (President's power to act
must stem from either Constitution or act of Congress), and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (separate statement of Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (courts
have upheld delegations because judicial review ensures agencies exercise delegated power within stat-
utory limits)). The presentment requirement is presumably also unnecessary as simply redundant in
the context of action by executive agencies.
The Chadha Court also noted in footnote 16 that "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its
power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitution-
ally control administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto." 462 U.S. at 954 n.16. This
Note argues, in contrast, that Congress' authority to delegate provides strong support for a restricted
legislative veto.
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soning derived from the principle of absolute nondelegation. The Chadha
opinion, in characterizing the legislative veto as an exercise of legislative
power,30 adopted a definition of legislative action which presumes absolute
nondelegation."1 The Court cited as evidence of the veto's legislative char-
acter its alteration of the legal rights of persons outside the legislative
branch, 2 and its determination of policy. 3 These characteristics, however,
do not currently distinguish legislative from executive action; administra-
tive agencies, acting pursuant to delegations of broad authority, routinely
determine policy and alter legal rights.3" These characteristics can define
legislative action only when the nondelegation principle is so strictly en-
forced that the executive must mechanically execute the law, without the
exercise of discretion. The Court's definition thus rests upon a premise in
direct conflict with that underlying the administrative state, which
presumes that the executive may exercise discretion in implementing con-
gressional policy.
Having used a presumption of nondelegation to classify the legislative
veto as legislative action, the Court asserted that all exercises of legislative
30. The Court began with a presumption that the veto was an exercise of legislative power. 462
U.S. at 951 ("When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has
delegated to it."). The Court then proceeded to identify the characteristics, described in text above,
which in fact rendered the veto "legislative in purpose and effect." Id. at 952.
31. Commentators on the Chadha decision thus far have generally adopted either of two positions
with regard to the Court's definition of legislative power. The first simply characterizes that definition
as a nondefinition, due to its functional inadequacy. See, e.g., Strauss, Was There A Baby in the
Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789,
794-801; Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. oN LEGiS.
1, 9-10 (1984). The second holds that the definition is derived from an arbitrarily strict construction
of the constitutional text. See, e.g., Smolla, Bring Back the Legislative Veto: A Proposal for a Consti-
tutional Amendment, 37 ARK. L. REv. 509, 515-16 (1983); Note, INS v. Chadha: The Future De-
mise of Legislative Delegation and the Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 11 J. LEGiS. 317,
334-35 (1984). This Note, in contrast, recognizes the Court's definition as a definition, but one which
rests upon a different premise-nondelegation-than does the modern administrative state. The use of
nondelegation as a premise, moreover, supplies a rational basis for the Court's strict construction of
article I.
Some critics have also drawn a connection between Chadha and the nondelegation doctrine, though
generally on the basis of its result rather than its reasoning. The Chadha decision, by depriving
Congress of a tool that greatly facilitates the delegation of legislative power, has the practical result of
forcing Congress to cut back on such delegations. See, e.g., Tribe, supra, at 17; Note, supra, at
339-42. Richard Goldsmith has recognized the importance of absolute nondelegation to the Court's
reasoning, noting that the assertion that lawmaking cannot occur outside the legislature was the
"linchpin" of the Court's rationale. Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A
Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 749, 756 (1984). Goldsmith simply argues, however, that the
Court should not revive the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 751-61. This Note proceeds beyond the
point of recognizing the importance of the doctrine to the Court to argue that the Court misapplied
the doctrine.
32. 462 U.S. at 952.
33. Id. at 954.
34. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1982) (Federal Communications Commission authorized to
grant radio station licenses if "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will be served thereby); 49




power, including the veto, must satisfy the requirements of presentment
and bicameralism.3 5 These requirements, the Court observed, serve three
essential functions. Presentment protects the executive branch from intru-
sion by Congress, and protects the people from improvident laws; bicam-
eralism assures that the legislative power is exercised only after opportu-
nity for study and debate in two separate settings.36 Failure of the one-
House legislative veto to comply with presentment and bicameralism left
these concerns unmet and rendered the veto unconstitutional.3 7 This posi-
tion, too, comports with the principle of strict nondelegation, which as-
sumes that presentment and bicameralism are checks without which the
people would not have entrusted lawmaking power to Congress.
The Chadha reasoning is thus inconsistent with the Court's historical
approach to the issue of delegation, a conflict made especially significant
by its context. The legislative veto has in the past facilitated standardless
delegations of the legislative power; appropriately restricted, however, the
veto could in fact complement enforcement of the standards requirement.
Had the Court in Chadha acted in accord with its earlier requirement of
standards rather than nondelegation, the outcome of Chadha could have
been quite different.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE STANDARDS REQUIREMENT
The Court's limited application of the standards requirement" led in-
exorably to a decline in the enactment of statutory standards. The princi-
35. The Court noted that the legislative veto did not qualify under any of the "four provisions in
the Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreview-
able force of law, not subject to the President's veto," including impeachment (House), art. I, § 2, cl.
5; trial following impeachment (Senate), art. I, § 3, c. 6; review of presidential appointments (Sen-
ate), art. II, § 2, cl. 2; and treaty ratification (Senate), art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 462 U.S. at 955-56.
36. 462 U.S. at 951.
37. Id. at 959. In two summary affirmations, the Court extended the holding of Chadha to legis-
lative vetos affecting rulemaking by executive and independent agencies. Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affg Consumer Energy
Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S.
Ct. 3556 (1983), affg Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per
curiam).
38. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the Court struck down a regulation designating
membership in the Communist Party as grounds for refusal of a passport. The Court declared the
regulation unauthorized under a narrow interpretation of the Passport Act, reasoning that a broader
interpretation would endanger individual liberties and might render the Act an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative authority. Id. at 129. Justice Brennan, concurring in United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 275 (1967), observed that "[t]he area of permissible indefiniteness narrows . . . when the
regulation invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights. . . . This is because
the numerous deficiencies connected with vague legislative directives . . . are far more serious when
liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake."
The Court has also implied that Congress may not delegate its explicit constitutional power to tax.
See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (NCTA) and FP0 v. New
England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974), interpreting the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of
1952 to authorize the Federal Power Commission and the Federal Communications Commission,
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pal reason for the Court's lax enforcement of the standards requirement
was apparently a recognition that meaningful standards are not feasible in
every situation requiring Congress to delegate authority. As the Court ac-
knowledged in American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,39 Congress cannot
devise a standard for use in unforeseeable circumstances.40 Moreover,
Congress may lack either the expertise or the institutional capacity to de-
termine policy for even foreseeable circumstances. The number and com-
plexity of issues facing the federal government preclude close and compe-
tent scrutiny by each individual member of Congress of every situation
requiring discretionary agency action.41 Strict adherence to the standards
requirement when standards could not be written would have frustrated
the efficient operation of government. Accordingly, the Court opted to re-
lax the standards requirement.42
The sharp increase since the 1930's in the use of the legislative veto
exacerbated the problem of standardless delegations."3 As critics of the
respectively, to charge regulated companies only fees to cover specific services rendered. The Court
suggested in NCTA, 415 U.S. at 340-41, that if the Act were read to authorize a tax on regulated
companies, rather than a fee, the Act might constitute an invalid delegation of legislative authority.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 603 (1963), remained until 1980
the only argument by a member of the Supreme Court for general application of the standards re-
quirement. A number of commentators, however, have urged a return to the requirement on a wide-
spread basis. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 217 (1974); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 78-94 (1978); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-107, 300-01 (1979); Aranson, supra note 7; Gewirtz, The
Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 49-65.
39. 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
40. American Power upheld a vague delegation when it was "unreasonable and impracticable to
compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules. ... 329 U.S. at 105; see also United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (upholding FCC regulation of cable television under Com-
munications Act of 1934, even though Congress of 1934 could not have foreseen development of cable
television).
41. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713, 722 (1969).
42. But see J. ELY, supra note 38, at 132-33 (arguing that nondelegation doctrine suffered
"death by association" with substantive due process and restrictive interpretation of commerce power);
Aranson, supra note 7, at 16 (suggesting that Court found other legal doctrines, such as procedural
due process and equal protection, better suited than nondelegation doctrine to control "legislatively
authorized executive excesses").
43. Since the first legislative veto appeared in 1934, Legislative Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1933, Pub. L. No. 72-212, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414-15 (1932) (expired 1935), legal scholars and the
federal courts have debated the veto's constitutionality. For commentary in opposition to the legislative
veto, see J. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS (1977); Bruff & Gell-
horn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a
Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congres-
sional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In
Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735 (1979); Martin, The Legislative Veto
and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982); Scalia, The Legis-
lative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload, 3 REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19; Watson,




veto correctly charged, Congress employed the veto mechanism more often
than not for purposes antithetical to the standards requirement. 44 Con-
gress often found it politically convenient to entrust the determination of
general policy to agency officials not directly accountable to the voters,
rather than to risk making a controversial policy choice itself.45 Similarly,
the veto most likely relieved Congress of the need to expend the time and
effort required to achieve a compromise when policymaking would have
been internally divisive. The legislative veto facilitated avoidance of diffi-
cult policy choices by permitting Congress to preempt any agency policy
choice that it found politically unacceptable.
The objective apparently underlying the Chadha decision was to check
the proliferation of broad congressional delegations of discretionary au-
thority. The Court's concern is evident first in the Court's premise that
Congress may not delegate legislative authority to another branch of gov-
ernment. Also, by invalidating the legislative veto, the Court deprived
Congress of a significant control over administrators' policy decisions, a
result which should make Congress less willing to delegate. Finally, as a
number of commentators have noted,' 6 the Chadha result is consistent
with recent arguments by Justice Rehnquist for a revival of the standards
requirement.4' Although these arguments did not persuade a majority of
the Court, the Chadha result indicates a commitment to nondelegation
much greater than the lack of support for Justice Rehnquist's position
suggests.
The legislative veto could also, however, complement and thereby rein-
For commentary in support of the legislative veto, see Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Con-
temporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323
(1977); Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8; Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Constitutional Sepa-
ration of Powers, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 195 (1981) (J. Bessette &
J. Tulis eds.); Javits & Klein, supra note 8; Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving
the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 351 (1978); Stewart, Constitutionality of
the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 43, at 1381-1409, 1426-28 (in five case studies of
regulatory rulemaking, Congress left key issues unresolved in authorizing statutes and relied on legis-
lative veto mechanism to maintain control over agency policy initiatives); Martin, supra note 43, at
268-71 (rather than make difficult policy choice on duty of local transit authorities to accommodate
the disabled, Congress delegated decision to Department of Transportation, subject to Congressional
veto of unpopular regulations).
45. See J. ELY, supra note 38, at 133 (quoting Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1695 (1975)); Martin, supra note 43, at 267-74. Alternatively,
Congress may be driven by mere laziness or by preoccupation with more pressing concerns.
46. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 754-55; Rabin, An Overview of the Chadha Case, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 703, 712 (1984); Note, supra note 31, at 340-41.
47. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that Court should "reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Con-
gress itself make the critical policy decisions"); American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 547 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Congress may not "simply abdicate[ ] its responsibility
for the making of a fundamental and most difficult policy choice").
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force the standards requirement by providing an alternative for situations
in which standards are not feasible. For example, when an agency had to
cope with unstable or unforeseeable circumstances, Congress could iden-
tify a general objective and, through the veto mechanism, review particu-
larized policy decisions made by the agency. Similarly, when Congress
lacked sufficient time or expertise, it could entrust detailed policymaking
to more expert agency staffs, reserving the power to veto agency proposals
that conflicted with a stated general objective. The, veto thus could serve
the purpose of the standards requirement by enabling Congress to retain
final control of subordinate policymaking where such control ex ante is
impossible."'
III. DEFINING A RESTRICTED LEGISLATIVE VETO
Congressional abuse of the legislative veto to facilitate avoidance of dif-
ficult policy decisions has detracted from otherwise strong arguments that
the veto could advance the goal of congressional responsibility underlying
the standards requirement. Rather than discrediting these arguments en-
tirely,49 however, such abuse implies at most a need for restrictions on the
exercise of the legislative veto. Such restrictions should serve two func-
tions. First, they should ensure that the veto furthers the goal of the stan-
dards requirement. Specifically, the veto should be neither so available nor
so structured as to encourage congressional avoidance of all policy deter-
mination at the time of delegating authority. Second, availability of the
veto should be sufficiently restricted so that failure of the veto to comply
with presentment and bicameralism would be for practical, if not theoreti-
cal, purposes insignificant, or at least in line with other instances in which
the Court has already indicated that compliance is not necessary. The
checks of presentment and bicameralism are explicit concerns of the
Chadha opinion, but are also present implicitly in the standards
requirement.
A. Elimination of the Negative-Form Veto
The first objective of encouraging congressional policymaking could be
achieved in part by eliminating the negative-form legislative veto. Prior to
Chadha, a substantial majority of veto provisions took the negative form, 50
48. See Abourezk, supra note 43, at 330-35; Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at 511; Miller &
Knapp, supra note 43, at 376-77.
49. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 43, at 1439 (arguing that disadvantages of legislative
veto cannot be ameliorated and require Congress to abandon veto); Martin, supra note 43, at 301-02
(same).
50. Of the 85 legislative veto provisions listed in Appendix I to Justice White's dissent in
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1003-13, 71, or 84%, are written in the negative form.
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whereby agency action pursuant to a grant of discretionary authority took
effect after a specified time unless Congress passed a resolution of disap-
proval.51 This structure relieved Congress of the need to articulate policy
when delegating authority, as Congress could easily veto agency proposals
after passage of the enabling legislation.
Similarly, the decision either to exercise the veto or not, represented
under the negative veto provision by action or inaction respectively, did
not require Congress to articulate policy. The veto resolution itself was
merely a negative reaction to an agency proposal, rather than an affirma-
tive statement of congressional policy. Disapproval could be for any of a
number of unstated reasons, and the legislative history typically provided
few clues to Congress' actual motivation. 52 Similarly, inaction by Con-
gress, representing tacit approval of an agency proposal, neither required
nor encouraged Congress to indicate its policy preferences. As a result, the
legislative veto in its negative form was a poor substitute for statutory
policymaking.
The legislative veto in its affirmative form, by contrast, could encourage
Congress to articulate a general policy when delegating discretionary au-
thority. Under an affirmative veto provision, agency action would take
effect after a specified time period only if Congress passed a resolution of
approval. In practical terms, however, Congress simply lacks the time nec-
essary for review and approval of every agency action. Demands for effi-
ciency in congressional operations would thus require the prescription of
policy guidelines for an agency to follow in most circumstances. The af-
firmative veto provision, moreover, would be more flexible than an uncon-
ditional delegation of authority, even one accompanied by policy instruc-
tions. As indicated earlier, 3 a primary reason for the demise of the
standards requirement has been the impracticality of requiring Congress
to predict all circumstances in which standards and policies must be ap-
plied. The affirmative veto would permit a requirement of general policy
prescriptions, while providing a safety valve for situations in which such
general prescriptions were inappropriate. In short, the structure of the
affirmative legislative veto, together with practical restrictions on its avail-
ability, would advance the goal of the standards requirement when en-
forcement of the requirement would be impossible or unwise.5 4
51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
52. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 43, at 1417 (floor votes of an entire House on merits of veto
resolution infrequent); Martin, supra note 43, at 274-77 (legislative history of legislative veto usually
less effective and less reliable indicator of congressional intent than legislative history of statute).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
54. Professor Kenneth Davis has argued that the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to
guard against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power, and that this purpose is best served
by judicial attention to the totality of protections against arbitrariness, including both procedural safe-
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B. The Constitutionality of an Affirmative Legislative Veto
Even under the affirmative form of the legislative veto, neither a veto
nor its complement, a resolution approving agency action, would be in
direct compliance with presentment and bicameralism." The veto, how-
ever, could be designed to comply derivatively with those requirements,
and the approval resolution could be so restricted that its failure to comply
would be practically, if not theoretically, insignificant.
guards and standards. Davis would require administrative agencies to create and articulate internal
standards to govern their policy judgments and preclude arbitrariness; in the absence of such internal
standards, agency action would be invalid. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15, at
206-16 (2d ed. 1978). Davis' substitution of agency standards for legislative standards is a second-best
solution, however, to the problem of congressional avoidance of policy determination. Davis would
permit such avoidance as long as agency policymaking were sufficiently self-circumscribed.
55. Critics of the legislative veto maintain that it: (a) violated the presentment clause by denying
the President the opportunity to exercise his veto power, see, e.g., Dixon, supra note 43, at 440;
Henry, supra note 43, at 749-51; Martin, supra note 43, at 295-300; (b) involved Congress too
deeply in agency administration of the law, thereby infringing upon the constitutional duty of the
President faithfully to execute the law, see, e.g., Henry, supra note 43, at 756-60; Scalia, supra note
43, at 21; (c) unconstitutionally arrogated to Congress the power of judicial review, see, e.g., Bruff &
Gellhorn, supra note 43, at 1429-33; Dixon, supra note 43, at 442-45; and (d) violated, in its one-
House form, the requirement of bicameralism, see, e.g., Dixon, supra note 43, at 441; Henry, supra
note 43, at 748-51; Martin, supra note 43, at 295-300.
Supporters of the legislative veto contend that: (a) the presentment requirement was satisfied when
the President signed the original legislation containing a legislative veto provision, or when such legis-
lation was passed over his veto, see, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 43, at 338-39; Stewart, supra note 43,
at 614; (b) the legislative veto was constitutional under the necessary and proper clause, which allows
Congress to constrain grants of both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power to the executive
branch, see, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 8, at 473; Miller & Knapp, supra note 43, at 382-83;
(c) the bicameralism requirement was satisfied when both Houses enacted legislation containing a
one-House veto provision, see, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 43, at 341; Dry, supra note 43, at 211; and
(d) Congress has the right to make conditional delegations of authority, reserving partial authority to
itself, see, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 8, at 473-76; Javits & Klein, supra note 8, at 473.
The federal courts, too, have participated in this debate. The U.S. Court of Claims, in Atkins v.
United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), upheld the one-
House veto provision of the Federal Judicial Salary Act of 1967 as "a device authorized by article I,
section 1, coupled with the necessary and proper clause." Id. at 1070-71. The Court noted that the
veto "contravenes neither the broad principle of the separation of powers nor any specific provision of
the Constitution." Id. at 1071.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), held the one-House veto provision of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 to be an unconstitutional violation of both the presentment and bicameralism
requirements. Relying on FERC, the same court subsequently struck down the one-House veto provi-
sion of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC,
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affid sub nom. United States Senate v. FTC, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 n.176 (1976), the Supreme Court dismissed as not ripe for
decision a challenge to the one-House veto provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 438(d)(2) (1982), when the veto had not yet been exercised. Justice White
dissented to this dismissal, however, noting that he would have upheld the veto provision as constitu-
tional. Id. at 285-86.
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1. Denial of Exceptions to Statutory Policy
Under the affirmative form of the legislative veto, actual veto of an
agency proposal would take the form of congressional inaction-in other
words, failure to approve. Such a veto, lacking any substantive manifesta-
tion, could not be subject as a practical matter to the requirements of
presentment and bicameralism; yet the veto would represent a definite
policy choice which, if given effect by positive action, would in theory be
subject to those requirements. That policy choice, however, would simply
be the policy previously authorized by the enabling legislation. More spe-
cifically, if the enabling legislation were to forbid an agency to deviate
from a given policy without congressional approval, congressional failure
to approve a deviation would merely reaffirm that policy. That policy
choice, being contained in legislation passed by both Houses and submit-
ted to the President, would have been previously subject to and in compli-
ance with the constitutional requirements. The legislative veto, therefore,
could be said to comply derivatively, if not directly, with those require-
ments. As described above,56 the Court sustained such a derivative satis-
faction of presentment and bicameralism when it devised the standards
requirement.
2. Approval of Exceptions to Statutory Policy
Congressional approval of agency action, on the other hand, would pre-
sent a problem requiring more than an analytical solution. Approval
would take the form of an affirmative resolution, potentially representing
an entirely new policy choice complying neither directly nor indirectly
with the requirements of presentment and bicameralism. If the approval
resolution could be limited, however, to a grant of an exception from the
policy declared in the enabling legislation, then waiver of the constitu-
tional requirements would comport with the Court's history of allowing
similar waivers under the necessary and proper clause, when noncompli-
ance was required by circumstance and limited in frequency.
The necessary and proper clause57 confers upon Congress the power to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers
vested in the government. Congress is not limited under the clause to such
measures as are indispensable to effectuating its express constitutional
powers. Instead, a congressional act is constitutional under the clause
when the desired end is legitimate and within the scope of the Constitu-
tion, and when the chosen means is appropriate, plainly adapted to the
56. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 18.
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end, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution."8 In Mc-
Grain v. Daugherty,59 the Court found the congressional subpoena to be
authorized under the clause. Congress issues a subpoena in the form of a
one-House resolution, which clearly avoids presentment and bicamera-
lism. Nevertheless, as the Court observed in McGrain, "[a] legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
. . . and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information. . . some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is
needed." 6 The Court therefore upheld the congressional subpoena as "a
necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate,"61 despite
the subpoena's failure to comply with the constitutional requirements for
legislation.
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,6 2 the Court permitted a con-
gressional committee, when previously authorized by statute, to require by
means of resolution that an administrative agency conduct an internal in-
vestigation. Humphrey's Executor gains special significance from its con-
text: a direct intrusion by Congress into the operations of the executive
branch. Despite such intrusion, the Court determined that neither consti-
tutional check was relevant to Congress' performance of this particular
legislative function-again the discovery of information without which
Congress would be unable or unwilling to legislate. The Court simply
declined, implicitly, to classify the demand for investigation, or the con-
gressional subpoena, as "legislation" for which compliance is of constitu-
tional necessity.
An approval resolution restricted to a grant of an exception from a stat-
utory policy would help to ensure that Congress did not act without ade-
quate information and would thereby facilitate consistent enforcement of
the standards requirement. When Congress lacks necessary information
by virtue of its simple inability to predict the future, it is often unwilling
to prescribe a fixed and comprehensive policy. The restricted approval
resolution would allow Congress to prescribe a policy according to infor-
mation available at the time of legislation, but to make exceptions to that
policy as the passage of time yielded further information.
Admittedly, the restricted affirmative veto would involve a different se-
quence of events than do the congressional subpoena and the order to in-
vestigate. The latter operate before the passage of legislation, while the
veto would operate afterwards. There would be a difference also in practi-
58. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1319).
59. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
60. Id. at 175.
61. Id.
62. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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cal effect. The veto or the resolution of approval would forbid or permit
some substantive action by an agency, while the subpoena and investiga-
tion order require only the provision of information.
These differences, however, would not rise to constitutional significance,
for they would not render the affirmative veto's noncompliance with pre-
sentment and bicameralism more dangerous than that of the other devices.
If anything, the potential dangers raised by the affirmative veto would be
less significant. As the veto itself would merely reaffirm a policy of its
enabling legislation, it would create no new interference with the execu-
tive branch and no new danger of an improvident law. A resolution ap-
proving an exception from stated policy would create no new interference
with the actions of executive agencies, for the resolution would simply
approve a request of the executive branch.63 The approval resolution,
moreover, would preclude improvident application of the enabling legisla-
tion to situations for which it was not designed.
C. Additional Restrictions on the Affirmative Veto: New Information
and Judicial Review
Limitation of approvals to necessary exceptions might occur as a matter
of course, were the standards requirement to be enforced. It would be
extremely inefficient for Congress, having spent the time necessary to
agree upon and articulate a policy, to devote considerably more time after
passage of the enabling legislation to approving frequent deviations from
that policy. External restrictions should nonetheless be imposed to provide
more certainty.
1. New Information
The first such restriction should be a requirement that an agency artic-
ulate the particular circumstances or new information justifying an excep-
tion from the previously enacted policy. This restriction would confine the
agency request to an exception rather than a change in policy. Congress
would be required, in turn, to approve an agency request without amend-
63. Resolutions approving policy proposals of independent agencies are less problematic in terms
of the separation of powers than those approving executive proposals. Officials of independent agen-
cies are not subject to the presidential removal power, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935); moreover, "independent agencies are often free, at least in a formal sense, of other
relationships with the White House that characterize the executive-branch agencies," Strauss, The
Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
573, 589 (1984), including centralized oversight of rulemaking and the obligation to clear legislative
matters with the Office of Management and Budget, id. at 590. Because independence removes an
agency from much direct executive branch control, presidential disagreement with a policy exception
requested by an independent agency and approved by Congress does not pose a problem of undue
interference with executive prerogative.
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ment. Such a restriction would, at least in theory, preclude Congress from
using the approval mechanism to effect a policy shift.
A hypothetical revision of the legislative veto provision contained in the
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 19754 can serve to
illustrate this requirement. The Act now authorizes a general distribution
of foreign aid but provides for a two-House veto of aid to governments
engaged in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized human rights . . . ."' The Act then lists a number of practices
representing such violations. Rewritten in the affirmative form, the Act
would forbid distribution of aid to foreign governments engaged in these
violations, but provide for limited approval of aid to such governments
when justified by circumstance. Such a statute would set forth clearly the
policy to be followed in most instances and in the absence of action by
Congress. The executive could, however, request an exception to this pol-
icy by stating its justification in a particular instance. For example, the
President might decide that aid to a foreign government with a record of
human rights violations was nevertheless necessary to prevent an economic
collapse. Congress could permit such aid by passing a resolution of ap-
proval. Congress would have to enact legislation, however, to impose addi-
tional restrictions on the provision of aid.
2. Judicial Review
The requirement that an agency delineate the specific circumstances
justifying an exception, however, would by itself be insufficient; judicial
review would be necessary as a supplemental restriction for several rea-
sons. First, judicial review could ensure compliance with the approval
procedure. The courts could ensure that an agency did not grant itself an
exception by violating a statute without congressional approval, and, more
importantly, that Congress granted exceptions without amendment and
only when properly requested.
Additionally, judicial review could ensure that a resolution of approval
permitted only a genuine exception to policy, not a disguised policy shift.
In testing the justifications offered by an agency, courts would ask such
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1982).
65. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1982) provides that:
No assistance may be provided . . . to the government of any country which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of
those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,
unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.
Congress thus may veto foreign aid to a government whose human rights violations outweigh the
importance of any benefit to needy people of that country.
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questions as these: Does the circumstance offered as justification actually
exist? Is the circumstance merely a one-time occurrence, or is it likely to
recur and thus necessitate further exceptions? Is the exception significant
relative to the size of the relevant program as a whole (in terms of cost,
duration, or other appropriate measure)? Courts would evaluate an ex-
ception without inquiring whether Congress actually granted the excep-
tion for the reason offered by the executive, or, rather, for political or
other reasons. An exception would be required to withstand scrutiny on
its own.
Finally, judicial review could ensure that a subtle shift in policy did not
occur by means of a pattern of congressional resolutions approving indi-
vidual exceptions to a stated policy-exceptions which, taken together,
represented a consistent failure to apply that policy in favor of another
policy, not yet articulated in legislation. In most instances, presumably,
exceptions under any given statute would be unrelated, stemming from
circumstances or information of specific, but not general relevance. When
such circumstances or information required a pattern of exceptions, how-
ever, congressional approval would be held invalid. Congress would be
required to amend the enabling legislation to provide a policy capable of
more consistent application. 6
An illustration of the effect of such judicial review can be drawn from
the Energy Security Act,6 7 which currently authorizes either House to
veto contract renegotiations by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC)
that exceed 175% of initial cost estimates. Rewritten in the affirmative
form, the Act would forbid the SFC to renegotiate contracts for amounts
greater than the 175% limit without securing from Congress an approval
resolution. Congress would be able to permit an exception from the 175%
limit if, for instance, a synthetic fuels producer needed to replace existing
equipment on a one-time basis to comply with a new requirement of the
Environmental Protection Agency. If more expensive contracts were nec-
66. The federal courts already have considerable experience with this type of judicial review in
the determination of consistent patterns or practices in statutory application. In anti-discrimination
law, for example, the discriminatory intent branch of equal protection analysis often requires courts to
infer purposeful discrimination on the part of government officials from patterns emerging from offi-
cial action. As Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), described: "The impact of the official action . . . may
provide an important starting point [in determining the existence of a discriminatory purpose]. Some-
times a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." Id. at 266. As Justice Powell
noted, the pattern need not be extreme to be detected and held unlawful, although without a clear
pattern, a finding of intent must be informed by such other evidentiary sources as historical back-
ground and legislative history. Id. at 266 n.13, 267-68. Despite obvious substantive differences, judi-
cial experience with this means of detecting the policies which underlie official action can inform
judicial review of approval resolutions for possible manifestations of underlying policy shifts.
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8724, 8741(d) (1982).
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essary, however, to permit a substantial number of fuel producers to com-
ply with that requirement, or if additional exceptions were necessary
within a given time period for other reasons, such as severe inflation,68
Congress would be required to amend the Act. Such patterns of exception
would indicate that Congress was willing to exceed the specified limit, and
thus vary from the expressed policy, on more than an exceptional basis.
CONCLUSION
A legislative veto written in the affirmative form and restricted to ap-
proval or denial of exceptions from a statutory policy would further the
responsible exercise of legislative .power by accommodating imperfections
in Congress' inability to predict the future. Exercise of the veto, as well as
passage of an approval resolution, would present dangers of no greater
constitutional significance than do other congressional actions for which
the Court has declined to require presentment and bicameralism.
Under the reasoning of this Note, the result in Chadha, viewed sepa-
rately from the Court's analysis, was both right and wrong. The Court
was correct in striking down a legislative veto provision written in the
negative form. Had the veto been written in the affirmative form, how-
ever, the case need never have been litigated. Written affirmatively, the
Immigration and Nationality Act would have provided that the INS could
suspend deportation of any alien satisfying the specified criteria; the INS
could not, however, suspend deportation of any alien failing to satisfy
these requirements unless Congress passed a resolution of approval. If
such had been the language of the Act, the INS, having decided that
Chadha satisfied the necessary criteria, could have suspended his deporta-
tion without consulting Congress. Congress would have had to enact new
legislation to revoke this suspension.
The Court in Chadha simply went too far by treating all legislative
veto provisions as though they were alike in both form and intent. The
Court should instead have been more circumspect in its analysis, as well
as more attentive to its own historical compromises with respect to both
the nondelegation principle and the requirements of article I. Had the
Court approached the legislative veto from the perspective of the standards
68. Courts could determine the existence of a congressional pattern or practice of related excep-
tions in two ways: (1) by determining the ratio of exceptions granted to actions taken by the agency
pursuant to the stated policy; and (2) by examining the number of exceptions granted within a given
time period (e.g., whereas five exceptions granted in a twenty-year period probably would not re-
present a significant pattern, five exceptions within one or two years probably would). The choice of
appropriate limiting ratios of exceptions per agency action and exceptions per time period would of
necessity be somewhat arbitrary, governed by judicial discretion and the particular circumstances of
the case.
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requirement, it could have addressed abuse of the veto and restricted its
use, rather than rejecting the mechanism entirely.
-Emily S. McMahon
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